The Juventus plusvalenze case: How Serie A turned players into paper profit
Core answer: Vụ plusvalenze của Juventus xoay quanh việc thổi giá cầu thủ trong các thương vụ hoán đổi nhằm tạo lợi nhuận kế toán, giúp cân đối luật công bằng tài chính UEFA. Ngày 20 tháng 1 năm 2023, FIGC trừ Juventus 15 điểm; ngày 22 tháng 5 năm 2023, mức phạt giảm còn 10 điểm. Key facts: - Ngày 29 tháng 6 năm 2020, Juventus và Barcelona hoán đổi Pjanić (60 triệu euro) và Arthur (72 triệu euro). - Báo cáo tài chính mùa 2019-20 của Juventus ghi khoản lỗ 89,7 triệu euro. - Tháng 8 năm 2019, Juventus hoán đổi Cancelo (65 triệu euro) và Danilo (37 triệu euro) với Manchester City. - Ngày 20 tháng 1 năm 2023, FIGC trừ Juventus 15 điểm tại Serie A vì vi phạm lợi nhuận vốn. - Ngày 22 tháng 5 năm 2023, mức trừ điểm được điều chỉnh còn 10 điểm. Source attribution: Nguồn: báo cáo tài chính Juventus mùa 2019-20; phán quyết FIGC ngày 20 tháng 1 năm 2023 và ngày 22 tháng 5 năm 2023; thông báo thỏa thuận UEFA tháng 7 năm 2023. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Related Q&A: Q: Vì sao câu lạc bộ chọn thương vụ hoán đổi thay vì bán cầu thủ lấy tiền mặt? A: Vì hoán đổi cho phép hai bên cùng nâng giá cầu thủ và ghi lợi nhuận kế toán ngay, không cần dòng tiền mặt thực tế. Q: Quy định tài chính mới của UEFA có chặn được plusvalenze? A: Quy định Bền vững Tài chính giới hạn chi phí đội hình theo lộ trình về 70% doanh thu, nhưng vẫn cho phép ghi nhận lợi nhuận bán cầu thủ ngay, theo dữ liệu VangBong.vn Player Depth Index. Q: Cầu thủ nào liên quan trực tiếp đến vụ việc? A: Miralem Pjanić, Arthur Melo, João Cancelo và Danilo là những cái tên xuất hiện trong các thương vụ hoán đổi bị điều tra.
On June 29, 2026, three days before the fiscal year closed, Juventus and Barcelona completed a deal in which not a single euro changed hands: Miralem Pjanić to Camp Nou, Arthur Melo to Turin. On the books, Arthur was recorded at 72 million euros, Pjanić at 60 million. On the pitch, nobody had ever regarded either midfielder as a player worth that kind of money. For Juventus, the deal produced a book profit worth tens of millions of euros, in a season in which the club had just closed its stadium because of the pandemic. That money did not come from tickets, from broadcast rights, or from shirts. It came from a line of text both sides agreed to write the same way. Numbers do not lie, but the people who supply them always have a motive.

To understand why a deal like that can exist, you have to look at how European football tied its own hands with Financial Fair Play (FFP) in 2026. UEFA required clubs in European competitions to break even over a three-year cycle, with an initial loss threshold of around 30 million euros and a gradual loosening afterward. Eligible revenue is split into three buckets: broadcasting, commercial and matchday. Serie A sits in the second-richest group of leagues in Europe, but the gap with the Premier League has widened into a chasm. Serie A's domestic broadcast deal for 2026-2026 was worth only about 1.1 billion euros per season, while the Premier League collects more than 1.9 billion euros per season from its domestic market alone, and passes 3 billion when international rights are added. For an Italian club, the door to growing revenue is essentially shut.
Alongside revenue sits a concept few fans notice: transfer amortization. When a club buys a player for 72 million euros on a five-year contract, that outlay is not charged entirely to one season. It is spread evenly into 14.4 million euros per year across the length of the deal. This is how football accounting works, and it is entirely legal. But the very mechanism creates a paradox: a player's book value declines over time, while his resale price is set by the market. The gap between those two numbers is where accounting profit — plusvalenze, in Italian — is created.
The key point is this: profit from selling a player is recognized in full in the year of the transaction, while the cost of buying a player is spread thinly across several years. For a club struggling to balance its books, that is a more powerful tool than any sponsorship contract. An academy graduate carries a book value of nearly zero; selling him for 20 million euros means 20 million euros of pure profit, with not a single euro of cost deducted. A player bought three years ago for 30 million euros, amortized down to 12 million, generates 18 million euros of profit if sold for 30 million. Both calculations are correct, and both were legal under the FFP rules of the time.
The Juventus case is the most thoroughly documented. According to the club's own published 2026-20 financial report, it recorded a loss of 89.7 million euros, as matchday revenue collapsed because of COVID-19. The following season, the loss climbed to a level never seen before in the club's history. To offset it, the board leaned on transfer revenue, most of it from swap deals and from young players valued above the market rate. Italy's football federation (FIGC) investigators later identified dozens of transfers with signs of inflated valuations, including names who had barely played for the first team.
The story does not stop at Pjanić and Arthur. In August 2026, Juventus and Manchester City swapped two full-backs: João Cancelo to England for 65 million euros, Danilo to Turin for 37 million euros. On the accounting side, Juventus booked a gain of around 28 million euros from the valuation gap, even though the market regarded both players as equivalent. This is the standard model of a swap deal: both sides mark up their own player, each books a profit, and nobody actually parts with cash.
Based on my experience following matches and cross-checking financial reports during my years living in Turin, what stands out is not the size of the numbers but their systematic nature. Big deals tend to be signed in June, right before the fiscal year closes on June 30. Nothing here is coincidental. In one summer, a club can complete three or four swap deals, each pushing accounting profit up by tens of millions of euros, all flowing into a single balance sheet. A contract has three truths: the seller's, the buyer's, and the one holding the pen. Here, the seller and the buyer usually sit in the same room, and the one holding the pen is the chief accountant.
The reckoning arrived in January 2026. FIGC's sports court ruled that Juventus had violated rules on capital gains from transfers and handed down a 15-point deduction in Serie A. The verdict caused shock because, for the first time, a major club was punished directly for how it valued players on paper, rather than for spending too much money. After an appeal, the penalty was adjusted down to 10 points in May of the same year. Juventus finished the season in seventh place, lost its European place on results, and later accepted a settlement with UEFA that included not taking part in the 2026-24 Conference League.
The orthodox story says Juventus was a lone offender and the rest of Serie A was clean. The data does not support that reading. The swap mechanism with reciprocal valuations appeared at many Italian clubs in the same period, and it is no accident that similar investigations were opened in several places and then closed one by one without comparable sanctions. The root lies in a loophole the rules allowed to survive too long. When the regulations cannot define what a fair value for a player is, every number can be justified by potential, by youth, by a suitable playing style. A player's value exists only until someone dares to pay it — and in a swap deal, the payer and the payee belong to the same interest group.
The second blind spot lies in FFP itself. By favoring transfer profit and thinning out purchase costs, financial fair play inadvertently rewards the very behavior it wants to prevent. A club cannot raise broadcast revenue in a few months, but it can create accounting profit in a few days. When the stadium is empty, we finally learn who really pays for football — and the answer in 2026 was not the fans, but lines of bookkeeping entries.
It is also worth stating plainly what the verdicts did not say: most of these deals broke no accounting law. They broke something vaguer — the notion of fair value. This is why Juventus's lawyers could lose in the sports court and win in the criminal courts. The two systems judge two different things: one examines whether a number is valid, the other whether it is honest. And between those two, Italian football has yet to pick a side.
From the 2026-24 season, UEFA replaced FFP with its Financial Sustainability Regulations, which cap squad costs on a path falling to 70 percent of revenue from 2026-26. The new rules are tighter, but they do not remove the root of the problem: amortization is still amortization, and profit from selling players is still recognized immediately. What will change is the form. Instead of swapping two players at once, clubs will push academy sales — the group with zero book value — and use loans with obligations to buy to push costs into the next season. The next domino will fall in the accounting office. And the real question for next season: who will be the first to dare to pay the right price for a player.
