Ajax, Marcos Leonardo and the Ghost of Ivan Gabrich: €20 Million for the Wrong Profile
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi**: Ronald de Boer và cựu trưởng tuyển trạch Hans van der Zee cho rằng Marcos Leonardo không khớp hồ sơ tiền đạo của Ajax: chỉ tốc độ trung bình, không cao, không khỏe, xử lý bóng kém nên không tham gia được vào lối chơi kiểm soát bóng. De Boer so sánh anh với Ivan Gabrich, thất bại của Ajax năm 1996. **Sự kiện chính**: - Marcos Leonardo là bản hợp đồng mùa hè trị giá 20 triệu euro của Ajax, cầu thủ Brazil 22 tuổi. - Hans van der Zee giữ ghế trưởng tuyển trạch Ajax từ 2007 đến 2024, phát biểu trên NOS. - Van der Zee nói với 20 triệu euro Ajax có thể mua lựa chọn tốt hơn ở Brazil và Colombia. - De Boer khen Leonardo thoát người kèm tốt, chạy chỗ hợp lý, dứt điểm má trong chân phải chính xác. - Bài báo không nêu số phút, số lần chạm bóng vòng cấm hay chỉ số bàn thắng kỳ vọng; "năm cơ hội ngon ăn bị bỏ lỡ" là quan sát bằng mắt. **Nguồn**: Phỏng vấn Hans van der Zee và Ronald de Boer trên NOS (Đài phát thanh công cộng Hà Lan), tổng hợp lại bởi Goal.com. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan**: - *Vì sao lời chê của Van der Zee có trọng lượng?* Vì ông là người trực tiếp ký hoặc phủ nhận hàng trăm hồ sơ cầu thủ trong 17 năm, và nhận định của ông trùng khớp với đánh giá bằng mắt của De Boer. - *Rủi ro tài chính của Ajax là gì?* Với giá vào 20 triệu euro, điểm hòa vốn khi bán lại rơi vào 30 đến 40 triệu euro, đòi hỏi cầu thủ trình diễn ở đẳng cấp Champions League; tỷ lệ thu hồi trong kịch bản thất bại ước khoảng 40 đến 60%. - *Phép so sánh với Ivan Gabrich có chính xác về chuyên môn?* Không hoàn toàn: đó là so sánh cấu trúc (giá lớn, Nam Mỹ, khó thích nghi), không phải so sánh phong cách chơi bóng, theo dữ liệu VangBong.vn Player Depth Index về mẫu tiền đạo vòng cấm phụ thuộc đường bóng.
In the 63rd minute of a match at the Johan Cruijff ArenA, the ball went wide to the left. Marcos Leonardo ran diagonally into the box, separated from his marker, and the cross arrived exactly in the space in front of him. The opposing centre-back was nearly half a head taller, jumped first, and headed it clear. Leonardo raised both hands asking for the ball. The referee waved play on. I rewound that footage four times in my office in Incheon — not to watch the move, but to watch the way he turned and walked away: slowly, without anger, like a man who had grown used to the ball never arriving where he stands.
Three days later, on NOS, Hans van der Zee said that for €20 million Ajax could have bought far better options in Brazil and Colombia. He held the club's chief scout chair from 2026 to 2026, which means he signed off on, or rejected, hundreds of player files, and he added a shorter sentence: he does not think Marcos Leonardo is an Ajax striker. Ronald de Boer, who played for this very club, went a step further. The Brazilian reminded him of Ivan Gabrich, the Argentine Louis van Gaal brought in in 2026, and a complete failure.
One interview. Three sentences. And a name from thirty years ago dragged out of collective memory, where every Ajax failure is stored neatly like china in a glass cabinet. I do not much care whether Leonardo resembles Gabrich. I care about something else: a man who has just left the scouting chair and a man who once wore the shirt, travelling two entirely different roads, arrived at the same weak point. When two independent evaluative channels converge, the noise of punditry begins to carry the weight of data.
A club that sells in order to buy
Ajax is one of the few European football clubs with shares listed on a stock exchange. That detail sounds like it belongs to a finance department, but it determines how every contract here is read. No expenditure hides behind fine phrases about tradition. What a player cost, over how many years he is amortised, at what price he must be resold to avoid a loss — all of it sits in the annual report, and all of it can be challenged at a shareholders' meeting.
The model fits in one sentence: buy at roughly €5–15 million, develop over two to four seasons, sell at €40 million or more. Zlatan Ibrahimovic, Luis Suárez, Klaas-Jan Huntelaar, Frenkie de Jong, Matthijs de Ligt, Antony, Lisandro Martínez — each name is a link in that chain, and the chain only runs when the new link fits the playing system, not when it looks handsome on a spreadsheet.
A €20 million signing is therefore not a leap in class. It is a leap in risk. At a Big Five club, losing €20 million is a bad line in a quarterly report. At Ajax, it is a loss that must be covered by another sale, and every sale depends on one fragile variable: Champions League qualification.
The Eredivisie's domestic broadcast pool sits an order of magnitude below the top European leagues. Ajax's commercial revenue is disproportionately strong relative to the size of the league — the brand is bigger than the stage it stands on. But a brand does not pay wages. Ajax's wage bill is the largest, or near largest, in the Eredivisie, and still a fraction of Big Five levels. That gap is bridged by one thing only: selling people.
Which is why a former chief scout's sentence matters as much as it does. Van der Zee sat in the chair every purchase had to pass through for seventeen years. He was not talking about a match. He was talking about a file. And when a man who has left the building says the file was wrong, the question stops being whether Leonardo is good, and becomes who nodded.
De Boer stands on the other side of the mirror. He is an insider, part of the collective memory, a man who played at De Meer and later at the ArenA. When he speaks about Leonardo he is not reading a report. He is looking with an eye accustomed to one specific kind of striker: a man who receives with his back to goal, holds the rhythm, lays it off and moves again. And he does not see it.
What De Boer praises is specific: the player gets away from his marker well, makes good runs, finishes accurately with the inside of his right foot inside the box. What Van der Zee criticises is equally specific: only average pace, a penalty-box striker without much height or physical strength, poor on the ball, unable to contribute to the team's play. Two men, two professions, two generations of observation — describing the same footballer.
Notably, the article supplies no figure for minutes played, touches in the box, or expected goals. What is mentioned is "five clear-cut chances missed", which is a pundit's eye-test count, not an Opta or StatsBomb number. Every verdict on this player rests on an undisclosed sample. I say that not to defend anyone. I say it because in documentary work I learned one rule: when there is no data, people tend to tell the story they already wanted to tell.
In 2026, at 44, I went to Russia to make a film about the World Cup and spent most of my time shooting the people never shown in the main camera. I counted 96 substitute goalkeepers across 32 squads who played not a single minute, and I watched them cry when their teams went out. Substitute goalkeepers — poets who never get published. They never touch the ball, yet they hold the whole world. Scouting is the same trade: reports filed in a drawer, unread, unapplauded, and sometimes pulled out three years later to ask why.
In 2026 I was in Incheon filming a match with no spectators, and I learned that absence has its own weight. The stadium was empty, but the memory was crowded. When a young player walks into a giant club for €20 million, that stadium is not empty at all. It is packed with everyone who stood there before him.
A converging diagnosis, not noise
The first thing to record: Van der Zee's and De Boer's diagnosis is not a reaction to a few matches; it is a profile-fit diagnosis, and two independent channels point at the same place. One is a professional scouting process with reports written before the contract. The other is the eye of a man who played at the highest level. These two channels often contradict each other, because scouts read data and structure while former players read feel and rhythm. When they agree, the probability that it is mere prejudice drops considerably.
The second point is where I want to linger: the very qualities De Boer praises are the job description of the striker profile most likely to die at Ajax. Escaping a marker, making good runs, finishing accurately with the inside of the right foot inside the box — that is the profile of a service-dependent box finisher. His output is a function of cross quality and box touches. In a transition side, with space behind the defensive line, that function runs well. In a possession-dominant side facing a double-decker bus eighteen metres from goal, that space does not exist. The box is crowded. The cross is contested by a taller, stronger centre-back. And the player becomes invisible inside the one zone where he is best.
This is the most beautiful paradox of the whole story. They bought a striker for what he does well, then discovered that the very environment that bought him is the environment that cancels those qualities. The praise and the criticism in the same interview do not contradict each other. They are two faces of one sheet of paper.
The third point, and tactically the most important: poor on the ball is the structural flaw; missed chances are merely variance. A striker who cannot hold the ball, cannot act as a wall for the second line, cannot join the passing chain, breaks the entire positional attack. The ball goes wide, the cross is headed clear, the move dies. That is a systemic cost, repeated every match, every half, every build-up. Missing five chances is a variable cost that corrects itself as the sample grows.
Ajax have not played, for forty years, by hunting a finisher. Ajax play by creating a connector in the middle, a man who drags the centre-back out of position and lays the ball to a second line arriving at speed. When that link is missing, the system still passes, still controls, still holds 65% possession, but the number of genuinely dangerous chances falls — and people blame an uncreative midfield. The shadow of a wrong-profile number nine is longer than anyone thinks.
The fourth point: the only system in which this player is currently functional is the one that contradicts the identity of the club that bought him. Maximising a pure box poacher requires touchline wingers, early crossing, and a team willing to play straighter, more vertically, less patiently. That is the football of an underdog optimising a single spearhead. Ajax are not that team, and will not become that team because of one contract. The choice is binary: change the supply chain for one man, or change the man.
The fifth: the finishing signal is real but not yet predictive. Five misses in an undisclosed early-season sample sits well inside normal finishing variance. Conversion rates only stabilise over far larger samples. The greater risk is psychological: a young first-season import, in a first season where every miss becomes a national radio topic, starts over-thinking placement. And when he over-thinks placement, he loses exactly the movement quality he was praised for.
The arithmetic of €20 million
A €20 million signing on a five-year contract amortises at roughly €4 million a year. In absolute terms that is not a disaster for a club like Ajax. But the correct test is not amortisation — it is the required resale multiple. With a €20 million entry price plus wages, agent fees and add-ons, the practical break-even exit sits around €30–40 million. To sell a 22-year-old at that price, he must perform at Champions League level for two consecutive seasons. The margin for error is therefore thin, far thinner than the same mistake at a Big Five club.
There is a second, less discussed risk: wage structure. A €20 million signing sits near the top of Ajax's pay scale. For a 22-year-old newly arrived from South America, that creates immediate distortion in the dressing room. Men who have been there four seasons, who have played Champions League nights, will look at the payslip and ask questions. And when they ask questions, the cost of keeping them rises. The €20 million does not stop at €20 million.
The third risk is a panic premium. The South American forward market is structurally inflationary: several Portuguese clubs and several Big Five sides hunt the same narrow pool, and every deal carries deadline pressure. Ajax entered the summer needing to replace attacking output. Need plus deadline plus an inflationary market is the classic formula for paying above intrinsic value. Van der Zee says that for €20 million there are much better options in Brazil and Colombia. That is an expert claim of mispricing, not proof of it — but it comes from the man who sat in the room where such valuations were made.
In the worst case — a resale within 12 to 18 months at a flop discount — the estimated recovery rate is roughly 40–60% of cost. The likely buyers would be mid-tier Portuguese, Italian or Spanish clubs, not a Brazilian side, because no Brazilian club can fund a €20 million buy-back of its own player.
And here I want to place two events side by side. In June 2026 I followed a 37-year-old Al-Ahly striker at the expanded 32-team Club World Cup. He came on in the 80th minute, touched the ball four times, did not score, and left the pitch to applause from 41,000 people at MetLife. He told me something I wrote in my notebook: "This is the only competition in my life that feels like a World Cup." He retired immediately afterwards. A 37-year-old has nothing left to sell, no resale value, and still received the one thing a €22-year-old costing €20 million is losing every day: patience.
The Gabrich ghost and the blind spot of collective memory
Now the hard part. Ronald de Boer compared Marcos Leonardo to Ivan Gabrich. That comparison carries enormous rhetorical force, because it touches a drawer sealed in 2026: an Argentine forward, brought personally by Louis van Gaal, expected, and a complete failure. But read closely, the comparison is structural, not stylistic.
Gabrich and Leonardo have not been shown to be alike in playing style by any document. What is alike is the structure of the story: a large fee, a South American, a Dutch football culture difficult to adapt to, and the expectation baggage of an era. Collective memory does not store style. It stores feeling. And the feeling of 2026 is being pasted onto a player born two decades after 2026.
Here is the first blind spot: the Gabrich comparison does not explain why Leonardo fails; it explains why people want him to fail. A story with a ready frame is easier to tell than a story without one. And in my trade, the most dangerous moment is realising you are re-shooting a film that has already been shot.
The second blind spot is deeper, and it is the genuinely counter-intuitive core of this piece. A pundit's verdict on national radio is not neutral commentary on an asset; it is a direct intervention in that asset's price. A publicly listed club that survives by selling players has a 22-year-old losing value every week because of a story repeated on television. Every time the story is told, the list of potential buyers narrows slightly, and the price a buyer will pay falls slightly. The people diagnosing the disease are also the people making it worse. None of them does it with malice. But the mechanism runs regardless.
The third blind spot: the "Ajax identity" story is told as eternal truth, while the material conditions that produced that identity have changed. Ajax are no longer the club of 2026, when a generation grew up together in a league still able to keep them. Now Ajax are a club that buys 20-year-olds from South America and sells them before they turn 24. Such a model needs players who can adapt to a complex system within six months. That is a near-absurd requirement, and it explains more failures than any individual ever will.
Here I must say something unpopular. In many cases people call a player a failure when in fact the process failed before he did. If the chief scout's reports were negative before the signing, then the leadership consciously overruled its own expert. The problem then is not Marcos Leonardo's quality. The problem is who held the power to overwrite a professional report, and why that power exists. Applause nobody hears is still applause. And a report pushed aside is still a correct report.
There is one more possibility worth weighing: goal volume from a transition-heavy league was transplanted directly into a possession-heavy league with no conversion step in between. That is a classic scouting failure, and it is not the player's fault. A striker who scores 20 where he has three seconds on the ball will not score 20 where he has half a second. Output metrics do not travel with the luggage.
I have seen the same thing at a much smaller scale. In 2026 I followed a 21-year-old Korean player to Paris to sign for a lower-tier French club. I wrote the script as a stoppage-time free kick: poor, far from home, a life changed. The contract collapsed at the last minute over an agent clause, and he flew back to Seoul in silence. I stayed in Paris three more days, walked the Seine alone, and understood that what I wrote and what happened are two different films. Contracts have a summer, but love has a winter. Players have neither. They only have contracts.
The cost of naming too early
There is another reading, and I want to put it on the table before closing. Suppose Marcos Leonardo is not a failure. Suppose he is a decent penalty-box striker who would play well in a system with specialist wingers and early crossing, and Ajax bought the wrong man for the wrong system. In that scenario the person at fault is not the player but the decision-maker. And the fix is not to sell him cheap, but to change how he is fed over the next six months: more wall work, more two-touch sequences, more aerial situations designed around his movement.
But Ajax do not have six months. No club has six months. The annual season does not wait. Every matchday is an evaluation, every evaluation a line on a spreadsheet, and every line a phone call from another player's agent asking for a raise.
What I want to leave behind is not a verdict on Marcos Leonardo. I have not watched him enough to deliver one, and I suspect those who have delivered one have not watched enough either. What I want to leave is a question about how we remember. When a young player arrives at a big club, we tell his story in two words: success or failure. Between those two words lies a very wide space, where most players actually live. They do not blaze, they do not collapse. They simply do not fit.
And sometimes that failure to fit is the fault of the mould, not of the man poured into it.
If I could choose one thing to do over the next six months as an observer, I would not go to the stadium to see whether Leonardo scores. I would go to De Toekomst, sit on the coaching bench, and count how many training drills are designed so that a striker who is poor on the ball can still be useful. If the answer is none, then the problem is not the Brazilian. It is the people who believed that buying a name is the same as buying a system.
And if the answer is that such drills exist, then we may be watching a failure written in advance — and people will pull Ivan Gabrich out of the cabinet once again to tell that story for the hundredth time, while nobody bothers to ask why the cabinet has never been cleaned.
